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In 1975, and as usual scratching where it itches, Steve Stich published Innate 
Ideas, a collection of philosophical papers illustrating and analyzing the varied roles of 
the concept of innateness in philosophical psychology. In the thirty years since then, the 
idea of the innate has flourished in both popular and academic writings. Not only has it 
received a fair amount of use (think Chomsky and Pinker; think Fodor; think Herrnstein 
and Murray; think the New York Times’ ‘Science Times’ every other Tuesday), it has also 
occasioned a good deal of mention, particularly in the last twenty or so years, as 
philosophers, biologists and psychologists have sought to develop a more precise 
understanding of what innateness is. 
In § 1 of this paper, I briefly survey this large elucidatory literature, starting with 
Stich’s influential account in the ‘Introduction’ to Innate Ideas (Stich 1975). Most of 
these proposals about innateness are reductive in tenor: they are attempts to specify in 
scientific terms what it is for some trait – be it a concept, a representation of Universal 
2 	  
Grammar, a heart, or a disposition to fool around – to be innate. As we will see, what 
emerges from these analytical sorties is not a better grip on innateness, but rather, a 
 
 
 
* Thanks to Peter Godfrey-Smith, Ben Jeffares and the folks at RSSS, Australian National University, 
summer 2006, for discussion of this material. And undying gratitude to the editors of this volume, and its 
victim, for patience well above and indefinitely beyond. 
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disturbing appreciation of its slipperiness. Innateness has been said to correspond to an 
array of underlying properties, most of which seem to have little to do with each other. 
Worse, each proposal is plausible in light of a certain range of cases, but outside that 
range is beset by counterexamples that cannot be dismissed as deriving merely from 
peripheral uses of the notion. So while there is a certain ‘family resemblance’ among the 
meanings ascribed to ‘innate,’ there is no analysis of the term that does justice to its 
multifarious uses. Despite our efforts, innateness insists on remaining a bunch of rather 
different, if related, things.1 
Or, perhaps, nothing at all? In §2, I explore the eliminativist option with respect 
to the innate – what one might call ‘elimiNativism.’ Very tempting indeed when 
confronted with the analytical anarchy surrounding ‘innateness,’ and urged explicitly by 
behavioral ecologist Patrick Bateson (Bateson 1983; Bateson 1991), neuroscientist Mark 
Blumberg (Blumberg 2005) and philosopher Paul Griffiths (Griffiths 2002), 
elimiNativism is the view that no natural kind (or at least, no unified, explanatorily useful 
property) corresponds to the concept ‘innate’ and that we should therefore stop talking as 
if one did. According to the elimiNativist, the concept of innateness does not cut the 
world along the dotted lines. Instead, it is a pre-scientific or “folk-biological” (Griffiths 
2002:76) idea with no role to play in science. Putative explanations in terms of  
innateness are at best void and at worst misleading, because it encourage fallacies of 
equivocation (Griffiths 2002:72). Rather than talking of traits that are innate, then, we 
should explain those traits’ development in terms of underlying processes and properties 
 
 
1 The position I take in this paper is thus a departure from the one I took in Cowie (1999). There, I argued 
that there are two ‘core’ senses of ‘innate’ as used in philosophical psychology. I now doubt that there are 
just two senses of the term used philosophical psychology, and I am certain that there are many more than 
that in other contexts. 
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that are really ‘in there’ – properties and processes like canalization, generative 
entrenchment, and a variety of genetic and epigenetic processes and interactions. If we 
free ourselves of our obsession with innateness, the elimiNativist thinks, we will be in a 
better position to understand the developmental phenomena that interest us. 
I have some sympathy with this line of thought, although as I will argue in §3, 
there is reason to be cautious in our linguistic and ontological prescriptions. Before I get 
to this, however, I want to point to a certain oddity in the trajectory of Steve Stich’s 
thoughts about innateness, namely, that he has never expressed any sympathy with 
elimiNativism. Normally not one to pass up the opportunity to hound treasured ‘folk’ 
notions (like belief, truth and rationality), Stich has nonetheless remained a champion of 
the innate – not in the sense that he has explicitly defended any particular nativist thesis, 
but in the sense that he seems quite committed to the concept’s remaining part of the 
discourse of cognitive science. He has sponsored conferences on innateness, and edited 
books on innateness (Carruthers, Laurence and Stich, 2005, 2006, 2007), and written 
influential papers exploring the boundaries of the concept (Stich, 1975, 1978, Ramsey 
and Stich 1990). 
The first section of this paper will motivate the question: Why is this so? 
 
Innateness looks ripe for elimination, so why isn’t Stich, paragon of conceptual and 
ontological austerity, an elimiNativist? The rest of the paper will offer an answer to this 
question on Steve’s behalf. I shall argue that Stich is justified in eschewing elimiNativsm 
for two reasons. First, the arguments for eliminating innateness aren’t as strong as they 
might initially seem (§2). Second, there are powerful pragmatic reasons in favor of 
keeping the concept current in cognitive science, at least for now (§3). 
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1.What is Innateness? 
 
We begin our survey of the concept of innateness with Stich’s ‘Introduction’ to 
Innate Ideas (Stich 1975). Like Locke, Stich rejects the idea that innateness is a matter of 
being present at birth: many traits that are thought to be innate (e.g., teeth, perhaps some 
concepts) emerge much later in development (p.3). He then distinguishes two main  
senses in which ‘innate’ is used in ancient and early modern discussions of innate ideas. 
The first, deriving from Descartes’ analogy between innate ideas and innate 
diseases, held that a belief (or more generally, a trait) is innate in a person “if, and only if, 
from the beginning of his life … it has been true of him that if he is or were of the 
appropriate age (or at the appropriate stage of life) then he has, or in the normal course of 
events would have, [the trait or] the belief ….” (Stich 1975:8) As Stich recognizes, such 
an account is hostage to one’s conception of a ‘normal course of events.’ Conceive 
normalcy too broadly, and virtually all traits turn out to be innate; conceive it too 
narrowly, and none do. While Stich leaves it open that a satisfactory account of ‘normal 
development’ could be articulated (i.e., an account such that just the right kinds of things 
come out innate), others have argued that there is no reason to expect such an account to 
emerge. (Cf. Cowie 1999; Griffiths 2002; Mameli and Bateson 2005.) 
Stich recognizes a second usage of ‘innate’ in the writings of theorists like Plato 
and Chomsky. This is the notion that innate ideas (beliefs or concepts) are those that are 
‘catalyzed’ or ‘triggered’ (pp. 14-15) by experiences that do not seem sufficiently rich or 
informative to account for the content that the resultant idea ends up having. The same 
goes for some innate behaviors: the way that a duckling behaves towards its mother 
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seems somehow richer than mere causal commerce with a middle-sized moving body 
could engender. The idea here is that a trait is innate if its external or experiential causes 
are in some sense inadequate to explain the trait’s existence or properties. The world is 
merely the 'occasion for' the development of the idea or trait; it doesn’t ‘construct’ the 
trait. 
One difficulty with this account is that it is very restricted in its application: it 
simply does not apply to many traits standardly held to be innate, like hearts and lungs, 
learning abilities, or genetic diseases. A second difficulty, and the one Stich emphasizes, 
is its vagueness: how do we quantify the informational content of beliefs and experiences 
so as to be able to tell whether the content of a belief outruns that of its trigger? How do 
we decide whether an external cause (or possibly, a cascade of external causes) is 
‘constructing’ or merely ‘occasioning’ the development of a behavior? Given that 
everyone agrees that all traits are partly internally and partly externally caused, how does 
one assign ‘more’ of the causative responsibility to one type of factor rather than another? 
(Cf. Cowie 1999, §1.5.) 
Stich leaves his questions about the dispositional and triggering accounts of 
innateness open; he offers them up, as it were, to the philosophical community as 
opportunities for further work. However, the philosophical community at the time 
declined Stich’s invitation to elucidate. This is not to say that the issue of innateness  
went away. On the contrary, Chomsky’s provocative claim that linguistic knowledge was 
innate provoked substantial and spirited debate in the 1970s and 1980s. However, while 
there was considerable ink expended on the question of whether linguistic (or biological, 
or mathematical) knowledge is innate, there was very little at the time that explicitly 
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addressed the question of what it is for such knowledge – let alone any other traits – to be 
 
innate.2 
 
From the early 1990’s, however, more and more theorists began leaning on the 
concept of innateness itself. There seemed to be a feeling, among many philosophers 
interested in the question of how traits develop, that calling some feature or property 
innate was at best just a gesture towards explaining how it comes into existence. To 
complete the explanation, one needs to know what innateness is, and how innate traits 
come to be expressed in the ‘finished’ organism. Some came at this issue from a more 
biological point of view; others were more motivated by uses of ‘innate’ in philosophy, 
developmental psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. 
 
 
1.1 Innateness and cognitive science 
 
Taking the latter group first, I argued (Cowie 1999) that neither of Stich’s 
analyses, even when made more precise, was adequate to account for uses of ‘innate’ in 
either the philosophical psychology of the past or in modern cognitive science and 
linguistics. I argued instead that ‘innate’ was used in two different ways in these 
literatures. On the one hand, ideas or bodies of knowledge are called ‘innate’ when they 
are acquired as a result of the operation of highly specialized, or domain-specific, 
mechanisms of learning. What makes an idea or concept innate, on this understanding, is 
its being got via the functioning of a device that is determined or constrained to produce 
output conforming to that idea. It is in this sense, I argued, that knowledge of Universal 
Grammar might be innate: we know Universal Grammar to the extent that it is implicit in 
our knowledge of the grammar of our language, and we know our language in virtue of 
2 A notable exception is Harman (1969a, b). 
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the operation of a specialized ‘language acquisition device’ whose job is to produce 
outputs conforming to UG. 
On the other hand, I maintained, ‘innate’ is sometimes used in a different way in 
both historical writings and modern cognitive science. At times, the term is used to 
describe ideas whose acquisition is inexplicable given the explanatory apparatus and 
concepts of psychology – to express, as I put it, a ‘metatheoretic gloom’ about our 
prospects for understanding how the ideas in question are acquired. For instance, when 
Fodor (e.g., Fodor 1981, 1997, 1998, 2001) says that most concepts are innate, he should 
be read as meaning that they were acquired by mechanisms the explanation of which is 
outside the scope of psychology.3 
A clear difficulty with the first of these accounts of innateness is that because it 
appeals to mechanisms of learning, it applies only to psychological and behavioral traits. 
It does not capture what is meant when (say) hearts, or secondary sex characteristics, are 
said to be innate. A difficulty with the second, metatheoretic (Cowie 1999) or 
‘primitivist’ (Samuels 2002) account is that because it regards a trait as innate if it’s 
inexplicable by psychology, it counts too much as innate: it’s not psychology’s job to 
explain why Christopher Reeve was quadriplegic, yet that trait was not innate for him. In 
addition, primitivism relativizes innateness to our explanatory interests and capacities. 
This does not seem to be right. The intuition is rather that innateness is a feature that 
some traits have regardless   of our explanatory practices. 
One could try to tinker with these accounts in an attempt to fit them to our 
intuitions. But this just leads to additional problems. For instance, one could count a 
trait as innate so long as it was acquired by means of some specialized developmental 
3 Samuels (2002, 2004) has developed and defended this interpretation, giving it the name ‘Primitivism.’ 
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mechanism, that is, a mechanism that had been designed by natural selection to produce 
that trait reliably at some appropriate point in the course of the organism’s development. 
Ideas got via specialized learning mechanisms would count as innate under this construal, 
as would the appropriate parts and processes of the body and brain. However, other traits, 
such as Down syndrome or Williams syndrome would not be classified as innate,       
since the genetic mechanisms giving rise to them have not been selected for that purpose. 
Also, many traits that are not normally counted as innate would be misclassified. For 
instance, if mechanisms of psychological and behavioral plasticity have been selected for 
(cf. Sterelny 2003), then the representations or skills arising out of such learning 
mechanisms – say, the belief that Dad is dangerous when angry, or the ability to craft a 
hand axe – would wrongly be classed as innate. 
A similar mess results from any attempt to widen the ‘gloomy’ interpretation of 
innateness so as to take account of intuitions about innate non-psychological traits. 
Whatever sciences S one chooses to include in one’s expanded definition (“T is innate if 
it’s inexplicable in terms of science S”), one gets some traits misclassified. Worse, the 
definition fails to deliver univocal answers about the innateness or not of a given trait, 
since what is taken as primitive for once science is often explicable by another. For 
instance, neuroscience can explain the development of ocular dominance columns in 
visual cortex but cognitive psychology takes them to be primitive; psychologists are 
interested in how we acquire our values but behavioral economists aren’t, and so on. 
These criticisms do not imply that these are bad analyses of innateness as used in 
cognitive science. What they do show, though, is either that ‘innate’ as used in cognitive 
science is a different concept from ‘innate’ as used in other sciences or by the folk; or 
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else, perhaps, that those whose focus is philosophical psychology are missing a deeper 
point that talk about innateness is meant to make. After all, intuitions are strong that 
innateness and the genes have something to do with one another, and yet neither of the 
‘psychologized’ accounts discussed in this section acknowledges this. Perhaps, then, we 
should look to the term’s use in biology, rather than psychology, in out attempt to 
elucidate its meaning? 
 
 
1.2 Innateness and biology 
 
Many theorists clearly thought that the answer to this question is ‘yes.’ For at the 
same time as cognitive scientists were attempting to understand the meaning of ‘innate’ in 
their discipline, a plethora of other accounts, more biological in flavor, began to appear in 
the literature. 
One line of thought, traceable back to Konrad Lorenz, has it that innateness has 
to do with genetic determination. However, as Block (1981), Kitcher (1985), and  
Mameli and Bateson (2005), among others, have argued, the concept of ‘genetic 
determination’ is itself a problematic one, and to explain innateness in terms of it is to 
trade one analytical pickle for another. For instance, if ‘innate’ means ‘genetically 
determined’ and ‘genetically determined’ means ‘caused by the genes alone’ then no trait 
is innate. But weakening one’s notion of ‘genetic determination’ leads towards errors in 
the other direction. For instance, if ‘genetic determination’ means ‘genetically 
influenced,’ then everything is innate. Lorenz introduced a notion of ‘appropriate 
causation by the genes’ to cash out ‘genetic determination.’ But this raises the question 
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of what counts as ‘appropriate causation by the genes’ – a question that neither he nor 
anyone else has ever answered adequately. 
A recent paper by Steve Quartz (2003) is illustrative of this difficulty. He 
articulates five different 'Innateness Proposals,' each specifying a different way to 
understand the notion of 'appropriate causation by the genes.' A trait is 'strongly innate,' 
for example, if the neural architecture realizing it is regulated solely by intrinsic 
processes and mechanisms (genetic and epigenetic); and if T itself develops solely as a 
result of such intrinsic processes, together with 'merely permissive' environmental 
interactions4; and if T has been 'evaluated' by natural selection. (p. 27). On another hand, 
a trait T* is innate in the sense of having been 'triggered' if it's just like T, except that 
instructive as well as permissive environmental interactions are among its causes.     
(p.28) It's unclear whether any traits are innate by these definitions, and if they are, 
whether they're the right ones. For it all depends on what's meant by (i) a neural 
structure's being regulated solely by intrinsic factors and (ii) the notion of a permissive 
(vs. instructive) environmental interaction. But we will not pursue these issues here. For 
suppose that Quartz is right, and there are five kinds of genetic causation, each covering 
some but not all prototypically innate traits. That in itself is almost sufficient to make the 
point I'm aiming at in this section, namely, that 'innate' means so much to so many that it's 
in danger of meaning nothing at all. 
A second major biological approach to innateness cashes out that concept in terms 
of genetic coding or genetic information: a trait is innate if it is coded in the genes, or if 
 
 
4 A ‘permissive’ environmental interaction is one that affects development by virtue of its mere presence or 
absence. This is to be contrasted with an ‘instructive’ interaction, where features of the environment affect 
development by virtue of their statistical structure or informational content. (Quartz 2003:30) Thus, the 
ingestion of food is a merely permissive environmental input, while being told that Elizabeth I bathed once 
a month whether she needed it or not is instructive. 
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all the information required for the trait’s development is encoded in the genes, the 
environment playing merely a supportive, non-informational role (cf. Maynard Smith, 
1993; Fodor, 2001, Bates et al., 1998; Fodor 1998, 2001; Quartz 2004). Such accounts 
must explain the notions of genetic encoding or information they invoke. Predictably, 
given that these are semantic notions, problems arise (Godfrey-Smith 1999, 2000a, 
2000b; Griffiths and Gray 1994, 1997, 2001; Griffiths 2001). 
There are two main approaches to understanding genetic coding or information, 
and hence innateness, on the present interpretation. First, correlational accounts say that 
T is genetically encoded (innate) when certain genetic properties – say, a deletion at a 
certain locus – correlate with T. (E.g., Sterelny and Kitcher, 1988.) But if correlation 
between As and Bs sufficed for A's encoding B, then environments would code for traits, 
too. However, they don't: being raised in an English-speaking environment correlates 
pretty well with – but doesn't encode -- being an English speaker.5 Second, selectional 
 
accounts of genetic coding or information say that a gene, G, carries information about T 
if G has been selected for its role in producing T. (E.g., Maynard Smith, 2000, Sterelny 
and Griffiths, 1999, Sterelny 2000). But diseases like Huntington's chorea are innate, and 
are said by experts to be 'genetic' or 'genetically encoded,' yet they have not been subject 
to any selection at all, so far as we know, for they present only after reproduction has 
occurred.6  In addition, Godfrey-Smith has argued that if genes code for or carry 
information about any traits at all, it’s most plausible to think that the relevant properties 
 
 
 
5 Such objections motivate some developmental systems theorists' skepticism about the theoretical 
usefulness of the gene-environment distinction, e.g., Griffiths and Gray, 1997. 
6 Now that genetic testing can reveal the presence of some genetic diseases before symptoms appear, 
selection against them may become quite strong, as individual reproductive choices are influenced by 
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are properties of proteins or other factors, not the high-level phenotypical properties that 
are the concern of nativists (Godfrey-Smith 2004, see also Samuels 2004).7 
A third biological approach to innateness is to focus on the link between 
innateness and developmental invariance. Both Bill Wimsatt and Andre Ariew, for 
instance, explore the idea that innate traits are developmentally invariant: they appear 
very reliably, and are very hard – and often dangerous – to interfere with. Wimsatt 
argued that innateness should be understood in terms of generative entrenchment. (E.g., 
(Wimsatt 1986; Wimsatt 1999).) On his view, a trait is innate if it has come under strong 
stabilizing selection due to its playing a role in the development of many other adaptive 
features, and if this stabilizing selection has resulted in the processes responsible for the 
trait’s development having been made more robust (i.e., harder to interfere with). 
Ariew’s proposal defined innateness in terms of the related but distinct notion of 
canalization. (Ariew 1996, 1999.) On this view, a trait is innate if its development is 
highly canalized, that is, buffered against a wide range of initial conditions and 
environmental variables – if it develops pretty much ‘come what may.’ 
These accounts seem to capture, albeit in different ways, the innateness of (i) 
bodily parts and processes; (ii) basic neural and psychological machinery; (iii) various 
behaviors and behavioral dispositions; and (iv) species-typical traits (like menstruating or 
growing body hair) which reliably occur later in development. However, they suffer  
from two serious flaws. One derives from the fact that learned beliefs and behaviors can 
be entrenched and/or canalized in exactly Wimsatt and Ariew’s senses. Yet it’s often  
said to be a sine qua non innateness that nothing learned is innate. Our acquisition of the 
 
7 Indeed, the occurrence of ‘alternative splicing,’ whereby genes may conform themselves in different ways 
to give rise to different protein products in different circumstances, may problematize even the idea that 
genes code for proteins, if coding is understood as a correlational notion. 
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vocabulary of a natural language is a case in point. It is buffered against what certainly 
seems to be a wide range of environmental variations: except for cases where the 
linguistic environment is radically impoverished, all children, whatever their 
circumstances, learn the vocabulary of their language. Further, it’s plausible that our 
ability to learn the phonological forms and meanings of words has been selected for and 
made more robust because of its vital role in the acquisition of linguistic competence, 
itself vital in our acquisition of numerous other adaptive features and behaviors. If so, 
then the mechanisms that allow us to acquire a vocabulary, whatever they are, would 
have become both canalized in Ariew’s sense, and entrenched in Wimsatt’s sense. 
Acquiring a vocabulary is buffered, and it is entrenched; yet vocabularies are learned, 
hence paradigmatically not innate.8 
Another potential problem with both Ariew and Wimsatt’s accounts is that they 
make innateness a matter of degree. For Ariew, traits seem to be more or less innate 
depending on the scope of the environmental buffering they are blessed with. For 
Wimsatt, traits would seem to be more or less innate depending on (i) the number of 
‘downstream’ developmental processes that depend on them and/or (ii) their degree of 
entrenchment or robustness.  This by itself is not necessarily a problem for these 
analyses: surely the idea that some traits are more innate than others can be 
accommodated by the folk. What is a problem, though, is the fact that the deliverances of 
these analyses are highly sensitive to one’s choice of a certain range of environments (in 
Ariew’s case) or particular notion of robustness (in Wimsatt’s case). Consider an 
 
 
8 It’s consistent with this claim that other aspects of our knowledge of language are innate. Indeed, the 
argument can be made more generally: bracket off whatever parts of language you take to be inborn; the 
rest still has to be learned, and because of the value of having a language, it’s plausible that that learning 
process will be both buffered and entrenched in our species. 
14 	  
example due to Mameli and Bateson (2005: 20): the development of normal hands and 
feet. Hands and feet are buffered against interference in a wide range of environments so 
long as the relevant range does not include environments in which thalidomide circulates 
in the placenta. If, however, the range does include such environments, then hands and 
feet are not buffered in that range. Likewise, one might ask, in what sense is getting 
hands and feet a robust developmental process if it can be interfered with so easily and 
drastically via the ingestion of thalidomide during pregnancy? Why choose one range of 
environments rather than another? Why choose a particular notion of robustness? It 
won’t do simply to pick the ranges and ideas of robustness that ‘give the right answer,’ 
for these will differ from case to case. We need a principled answer to these questions. 
A fourth biological notion that has been appealed to in attempting to clarify 
innateness is heritability: a trait is innate if it is highly heritable. (Cf., e.g., Herrnstein  
and Murray 1994).  However, this approach is bankrupt. First, traits that are universal in 
the population – like having a head – have a heritability of 0, so would not be deemed 
innate. Secondly, learned traits – like being able to read – have high heritability in many 
populations. Which brings us to a final problem for heritability-based accounts of 
innateness: since heritability is a population measure, heritability estimates vary with 
one’s choice of population. Thus, among children in California, having freckles on one's 
nose is highly heritable: basically, you get them if you're Anglo, but otherwise, not. 
Among children in Australia, by contrast, freckles are much less heritable, even among 
Anglos. For having freckles depends on exposure to the sun, which in turn is affected by 
whether your school has (as many do) a policy that sunhats must be worn when playing 
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outside. To define innateness in terms of heritability is to inherit this counterintuitive 
population-relativity. 
Finally, in this survey of attempts to ‘biologize’ innateness, we come to two 
related ideas: innateness as species typicality and innateness as adaptatedness. Again, 
neither is satisfactory, either alone or in conjunction. Some species-typical adaptations 
are learned or otherwise culturally transmitted: tool-making in homo erectus; some birds’ 
characteristic songs; wearing clothes in modern homo sapiens. And some innate traits 
(being a haemophiliac, being homozygous for the sickle cell gene) are neither species- 
typical nor adaptive. Being an adaptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for being 
innate, and the same goes for being a species-typical trait. 
 
 
1.3 The Inner and the Outer 
 
A third major line of thinking about innateness, and the last we will be covering 
here, is less overtly biological in tone. It focuses on the intuition that innate traits in  
some sense ‘come from inside,’ as opposed to ‘coming from the environment.’ However, 
this intuition proves difficult to nail down. Since all traits are produced via interactions 
between inner and outer, one cannot simply say, for instance, that innate traits are ones 
that are not caused by the environment, or that innate traits are the ones that are produced 
by "interactions internal to the organism" (Elman et al. 1996:23). 
But as we have seen already, in discussing Quartz's (2003) attempts to come to 
grips with innateness, there are many ways that genes and environments collaborate to 
produce phenotypes and it's not obvious which of these ways should be held to produce 
the innate ones. Moreover, as Mameli and Bateson argue in some detail, analyses in the 
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‘inner vs. outer’ vein founder when they confront particular cases. (Mameli and Bateson 
2005:8-9) For instance, consider the notion that a trait is innate if it is not alterable by 
environmental factors. This gets being a queen bee right: being a queen is not innate 
because whether a female becomes a queen or not depends on the amount of royal jelly 
she ingests. However, it gets having arms wrong: that trait is innate, despite its being 
environmentally alterable (say, by thalidomide, or by a Congolese machete). Or consider 
the idea that a trait is innate if it’s unalterable in normal environments: that would cope 
with the case, just discussed, of having arms. However, as Mameli and Bateson rightly 
emphasize and as we have seen above (§1.1), appeals to normalcy carry their own 
problems. If the relevant notion is statistical normality, then what is innate becomes 
unacceptably hostage to changing fortune and fashion. But if it’s evolutionary normalcy 
that is at issue, then we must (i) nail down the period of interest for the evolution of the 
trait in question, and (ii) determine what normal conditions at that time were, and (iii) 
decide whether the trait was alterable in those conditions or not. None of these is an easy 
task, of course, but even given an account of normal conditions in the Pleistocene, say, it 
is plausible that we would find many behaviors and properties that we would not want to 
count as innate despite their being unalterable in those conditions: eating only minimally 
processed foods, or having a short life expectancy are examples.9 
A related approach resting on the inner vs. outer distinction contrasts the innate 
with the learned. Thus, Fodor (1975, 1981) equates innate concepts with those that are 
unlearned. But, first, this approach makes innateness hostage to our conception of what 
is to count as learning – a notoriously thorny issue in itself. Moreover, it does not 
 
9 Of course, this argument depends on adopting a particular reading of ‘alterable.’ I won’t explore this issue 
here, except to note that the fact that alterability is a modal notion reveals another dimension of      
vagueness that dogs this analysis (as well as providing a potentially fertile source of counterexamples to it). 
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generalize beyond the mental: there are many unlearned traits – having a tattoo, for 
example – that are not innate. Mameli and Bateson (p. 15) explore the possibility of 
invoking the broader notion of phenotypical plasticity (rather than the narrowly cognitive 
notion of learning) in this context. For instance, they consider the idea that a trait might 
be innate iff it does not result from mechanisms designed to produce plasticity, i.e., 
“mechanisms adapted to produce different traits in response to different environmental 
conditions.” (Mameli and Bateson 2005:15). Again, though, this analysis encounters 
counterexamples and problems. For instance, there is a sense in which the genetic 
mechanisms responsible for sex determination in humans are adapted for plasticity: add 
androgens to the placental mix and you get a male rather than a female. Yet surely one’s 
sex, of all things, is innate? Moreover, a failure to be produced by such mechanisms is 
not sufficient for innateness. While the analysis gets such things as menstruation and 
body hair right (they are innate because the mechanisms producing them are not adapted 
for plasticity), it gets loads of other traits wrong: thalidomide-affected limbs, acquired 
sociopathy, Christopher Reeves’ quadriplegia: not a result of mechanisms adapted for 
plasticity, but not innate either. 
 
 
1.4 Innateness: a too many splendour’d thing. 
 
In § 1 so far, we have examined the following ways of understanding what it 
means to say that a trait, T, is innate: 
1. T is innate if T is present at birth 
2. T is innate if T emerges in the normal course of development 
3. T is innate if T’s external or experiential causes are inadequate to explain its existence 
or properties. 
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4. T is innate if T is acquired as a result of the operation of a highly specialized, or 
domain-specific, mechanism of learning. 
4a. T is innate if T was acquired by means of a developmental mechanism designed 
by natural selection reliably to produce T at the appropriate point in the 
organism’s development. 
5. T is innate if the processes responsible for T’s development are inexplicable given the 
explanatory apparatus and concepts of psychology. (‘Primitivism’) 
5a. T is innate (by the lights of some science, S) if the processes responsible for T’s 
development are inexplicable given the explanatory apparatus and concepts of S. 
6. T is innate if T is genetically determined. 
6a. T is innate if T is caused by the genes alone. 
6b. T is innate if T is genetically influenced. 
6c. T is innate if T is appropriately caused by the genes. 
6d. T is innate if (i) T has been selected for and (ii) the architecture of the part(s) of 
the brain responsible for the acquisition of T developed under the control of 
genetic factors together with merely ‘permissive’ environmental factors.10 
7. T is innate if T is genetically encoded. 
7a. T is innate if all the information required for T’s development is encoded in the 
genes. 
8. T is innate if T is generatively entrenched. 
9. T is innate if T is highly canalized. 
10. T is innate if T highly heritable. 
11. T is innate if T is species typical. 
12. T is innate if T is an adaptation. 
13. T is innate if T is “produced by internal causes.” 
14. T is innate if T is not caused by the environment. 
15. T is innate if T is not environmentally alterable (i.e., if changes in the environment 
cannot produce alternative phenotypes T*). 
 
 
 
10 A ‘permissive’ environmental interaction is one that affects development by virtue of its mere presence. 
This is to be contrasted with an ‘instructive’ interaction, which affects development by virtue of its 
statistical structure or informational content. ((Quartz 2003:30) 
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15a.  T is innate if T is not alterable in normal environments (i.e., if alternative 
phenotypes T* cannot occur in normal environments). 
16. T is innate if T is unlearned. 
16a.  T is innate if does not result from mechanisms designed to produce plasticity. 
 
 
Yet not one of these sixteen (or twenty-five, depending on how you count) accounts 
appears adequate to capture everything that we mean when we claim that a trait is innate. 
My conclusion echoes that of (Mameli and Bateson 2005):  the concept of innateness is 
fragmented and confused, and every analysis ever proposed misclassifies central 
exemplars of the concept it purports to elucidate. 
 
 
2.The Case for ElimiNativism 
 
Given the mess that the folk concept of innateness is patently in, it’s tempting to 
ask whether we oughtn't to try to do without it. In this section, we will look at whether 
there is reason to pursue this course. 
After distinguishing two different kinds of eliminativist project (ontological and 
linguistic) and explaining how they are related, I turn to the arguments for elimiNativism. 
There are three kinds of argument used to support an eliminativist position – what I call 
the 'Aren't Any,' 'Doesn't Work,' and 'It's a Mess' arguments. In §§2.2-2.4, I illustrate 
these arguments with examples taken from other areas of philosophy, and look at how 
they might apply to the issue of innateness. In §2.5, I suggest that taken together, these 
arguments raise a conundrum for theorists interested in development, which I then explore 
in §3. 
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2.1 Two Eliminativist Projects and Three Kinds of Eliminativism 
 
I distinguish two different kinds of eliminativist project: ontological and linguistic 
(or conceptual). The ontological project asks whether a given type of object exists or 
whether a certain property is instantiated. As it pertains to innateness, the ontological 
question is whether any trait out there in the world is in fact innate. The linguistic (or 
conceptual) project asks whether a given theoretical term (or a given concept) should be 
used or eschewed: does the term ‘innate’ have any substantive role to play in 
philosophical or cognitive scientific theorizing? (Henceforth, for ease of exposition, I  
will talk of eliminating terms and eliminating concepts interchangeably. The eliminativist 
arguments I will consider apply to both, mutatis mutandis.) 
These projects are related, but distinct. If a certain object or property does not 
exist, then there may be reason to stop using terms that purport to refer to it (in certain 
contexts, at least). But equally, there may be reasons to continue with that usage: centers 
of gravity do not exist, but there are many contexts in which it’s not just OK but arguably 
necessary to think and talk – and design bridges, or figure skate, or play pool – as if they 
did. Electrons are not just particles, and atoms are not like tiny solar systems, but when 
doing chemistry, one often talks as if they were. Conversely, the fact that a certain term is 
unfitted to play an explanatory role in any scientific or philosophical theory may be 
reason to think that the class or property the term purports to pick out does not exist; but 
equally it may not. ‘Socks’, ‘Hummers,’ ‘dirty jokes’ and ‘herbs' are terms that no 
reputable philosophical or scientific theory needs or wants; yet all those things are really 
out there, nonetheless. 
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In this paper, I will talk of eliminating ‘innateness’ when it’s the linguistic 
question at issue; when it’s the ontological question we are concerned with, I will talk of 
eliminating innateness (no quotes). 
Orthogonal to the distinction just made is one between the three kinds of 
eliminativist argument to be found in the philosophical literature. The first is what I call 
the ‘there aren’t any’ argument for eliminativism, or ‘Aren’t Any Eliminativism' for 
short. Aimed squarely at the ontological issue, it takes an analysis of a certain concept 
and argues that nothing in the world does (or, stronger, could) satisfy that analysis. This 
is the eliminativism pursued, for instance, by Hume with respect to causation, by Mackie 
(1981) with respect to moral properties, and more recently by Stich with respect to the 
propositional attitudes. Aren’t Any eliminativists may or may not advocate linguistic 
eliminativism as well: Stich (1983) thinks we can do without ‘belief’ and the like, but 
compare Hume’s (sometime) views about ‘causation’ or Mackie’s attitude towards moral 
talk. 
A second eliminativist strategy is ‘Doesn’t Work Eliminativism’. Aiming 
primarily at the linguistic question, the Doesn’t Work eliminativist contends that the 
concept of interest is enmeshed in a bankrupt theory: one that is false, explanatorily 
inadequate and part of a thoroughly ‘degenerate’ research program. On this view, the 
offending theory and its component concepts should be expunged from our thought, and 
its linguistic correlates should be replaced in our discourse by other, better, theories and 
terms. The ontological question in this case remains open. Because false theories can 
succeed in referring to real entities and properties (and here arise issues in the philosophy 
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of language that I will not explore), the Doesn’t Work eliminativist argument, even if 
successful, does not entail any position on the ontological question. 
A final kind of eliminativism is ‘It’s a Mess Eliminativism,’ again aimed in the 
first instance at the linguistic or conceptual question. But rather than taking an analysis  
of a concept and arguing that nothing satisfies it, as does the Aren’t Any eliminativist, and 
rather than arguing that the term or concept is embedded in a useless and dispensable 
theory (like the Doesn’t Work eliminativist), the It’s a Mess eliminativist argues that the 
concept in question has no determinate analysis, and that it is too vague or confused to be 
used profitably in a certain context. We see this form of argument in, for instance, 
Woodward (2003) with respect to the concept of a law of nature, and in Godfrey-Smith 
(1999, 2000a) with regard to ‘genetic information.’ 
Frequently, It’s a Mess eliminativists take their arguments for linguistic 
elimination to support ontological elimination too: given that it’s so unclear what the 
concept is a concept of the existence of its object(s) must be dubious as well. However, 
the mere fact that a concept is unanalyzable can’t by itself entail any sort of 
eliminativism: most concepts are unanalyzable! So the It’s a Mess eliminativist’s 
argument must include a claim to the effect that there is something about the uses to 
which the concept is put, or the practical consequences of its unanalyzability, that cause 
unusual difficulties in this case. If, for instance, the eliminativist claim were just that 
concept C is unsuitable for use in some science, or in metaphysics or philosophy of 
science, it may not follow that there are no Cs. We’ve seen this with socks and herbs. 
‘Memory’ is another case in point, as David Chalmers (pers. comm.) has pointed out to 
me. ‘Memory’ (unqualified) refers to a plethora of mental states and processes (long 
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term memory, short term memory, procedural memory, somatic memory, etc.). As such, 
it lacks the precision that neuroscientists and philosophers dealing with these phenomena 
require, and for the purposes of theorizing, most experts on memory are eliminativists 
about ‘memory.’ None, however, are eliminativists with respect to memory! 
With these brief sketches in hand, let us see in more detail how the various 
strategies work, and how they might be wielded against innateness. 
 
 
2.2Aren’t Any Eliminativism and its Bearing on ElimiNativism 
 
The Aren’t Any eliminativist takes an analysis of some concept or term, like 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘belief’ or ‘true’ or ‘rational’, and argues that there is nothing in the 
world that corresponds to that analysis, that is, that there is no such thing as goodness, or 
badness, or beliefs, or truth. Confronted with this situation, one should probably replace 
talk of the good or beliefs or truth with other, more accurate ways of talking. But if we 
continue to use these dubious terms and concepts, we must be aware that when we think 
or talk in those ways, we often speak and think falsely.11 
 
A good example of Aren’t Any Eliminativism is Steve Stich’s (1983) argument 
for the view that folk-psychological concepts like belief “ought not to play any 
significant role in a science aimed at explaining human cognition and behavior” (1983:5, 
emphasis Stich’s). Stich’s argument begins with an analysis of the notion of belief. 
When we ascribe the belief that p to someone, he maintains, we attribute to her a certain 
relation towards a token sentence, stored somehow in her brain, which means that p. 
 
 
11 Or maybe even meaninglessly, depending on your semantic theory. Note that whatever his semantic 
theory, the Aren’t Any eliminativist can’t hold that all talk involving such terms is false or meaningless: 
‘There are no beliefs’ is a statement that Stich and Churchland both embrace! Thanks to Frank Jackson for 
this point. 
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Two mental sentence tokens (hence two belief tokens) are of the same type in virtue of 
their contents. Thus, these mental sentences, Stich argues, are individuated ‘widely’ (or 
‘semantically’), not ‘narrowly’ (‘syntactically’ or ‘functionally’). 
However, Stich contends, being of the same belief-type is not a matter of having 
the same content. Instead, the folk individuate beliefs in terms of similarity of content. 
This raises a problem. Since similarity judgments are notoriously context-sensitive and 
vague, a taxonomy of mental states based on them will be vague and context-sensitive 
too.  Worse, since the folk judge similarity of content relative to their own contents, our 
taxonomy will be observer-relative and limited in application to thinking beings very like 
the folk. 
But the taxonomy of mental states used in cognitive science won’t be vague, 
context-sensitive, observer-relative, or limited in application! Its taxonomy will be 
precise, objective, and applicable to any thinking thing. For the purposes of science, 
Stich argues, the folk’s talk of beliefs individuated in terms of content will be replaced 
with talk of different kinds of entities – ‘beliefs*’ – which are individuated in terms of 
their syntactic (narrow, functional, non-semantic) properties. Propositional attitudes* – 
not the propositional attitudes of the folk – will be what are quantified over in the 
sciences of the mind. So according to the scientists, there’ll be nothing in our heads that 
has the properties (i.e., the semantic properties) that we ascribe to beliefs, etc. In which 
case, Stich intimates, the beliefs, desires, hopes and fears of the folk must be eliminated: 
“[i]f our science is inconsistent with the folk precepts that define who and what we are, 
then we are in for rough times.  One or the other will have to go.” (Stich 1983:10, 
emphasis added.) 
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Returning to innateness, it is immediately clear that the Aren’t Any strategy is 
unable to support ElimiNativism – and I suspect that this is one reason why Stich is not an 
elimiNativist. The Aren’t Any argument against propositional attitudes worked     
because Stich was able to establish that propositional attitudes are essentially contentful: 
if anything is to count as a belief, it has to be the kind of thing that is individuated in 
terms of its content. Given the plausibility of this essentialist claim about beliefs, Stich is 
able to argue that since a scientific taxonomy of the mental is very unlikely to end up 
individuating mental states in terms of content, the ontology of folk psychology will not 
be empirically vindicated. 
Of course, there are many things to be said about all this [REF to someone else in 
the volume?] Our concern, however, is with the applicability of this form of eliminativist 
argument to innateness, and it is very clear that it does not apply at all. For what is 
striking about the plethora of analyses of innateness surveyed in the previous section is 
that there seems to be nothing that is essential to the folk concept ‘innate’! 
But if there’s nothing that’s essential to innateness, then the Aren’t Any 
eliminativist’s strategy cannot even begin to get off the ground. And thus, returning to 
the question posed in §1, Stich is quite right not to have applied the Aren’t Any strategy 
that worked so well in the case of propositional attitudes to the question of innateness. 
But there are other eliminativist arguments to consider: should Stich have pursued 
one of them? 
 
 
2.3Doesn’t Work Eliminativism and the Innate. 
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The Doesn’t Work eliminativist argues that the concept or term of interest is 
embedded in a false, unproductive, or otherwise scientifically useless theory. For that 
reason, he maintains, we should cease using that concept. A classic example of this 
eliminativist strategy is Paul Churchland’s assault on the propositional attitudes of folk 
psychology (Churchland 1981). He argues, first, that folk psychology is an empirical 
theory, on a par (in terms of its epistemic status) with other empirical theories. For 
instance, it makes generalizations that quantify over a variety of theoretical entities, such 
as beliefs and desires, and it is sensitive in a variety of ways to evidence. Since folk 
psychology is an empirical theory, he points out, it “might (really) be false” (72). Which, 
he thinks, it is. First, Churchland argues that although it does enjoy some explanatory 
successes (you and I succeed in meeting up at the Impeachment Rally in West LA 
because each believes the other will be there, each wants to see the other, and each takes 
appropriate steps, based on her further beliefs and desires, to arrive on the right day at the 
right time at the Federal Building in Westwood), folk psychology nonetheless is weighed 
down with numerous serious explanatory failures. It has nothing to say about mental 
illness, creativity, the origins of intelligence differences, the nature and functions of  
sleep, visual perception and illusions, memory, or learning. Because folk psychology 
offers so little insight about so many matters ostensibly within its domain, Churchland 
argues, it is “at best a highly superficial theory, a partial and unpenetrating gloss on a 
deeper and more complex reality.” (74) As to its history, “the story is one of retreat, 
infertility and decadence.” (74). Its domain has contracted; primitive people used folk 
psychology to explain the workings of the world quite generally. Its understanding of 
those things left in its domain (viz., our minds) “[has] not advanced sensibly in two or 
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three thousand years,” (74) this despite the “backlog” of anomalies and explanatory 
failures that should have spurred its refinement. In addition, folk psychology appears not 
to cohere with other human and biological sciences: “its intentional categories stand 
magnificently alone, without visible prospect of reduction [to other sciences].” (75) 
In sum, folk psychology, together with its classification of mental states as  
beliefs, desires, sensations etc., is a highly limited theory, rife with explanatory failures 
and anomalies, that has been stagnant and in retreat for millennia. Just as folk psychology 
turned out to be false of the weather (clouds do not move because they want                   
to), it will likely turn out to be false of us and our behavior. This idea is supported by the 
fact that despite years of effort, there is no prospect of reducing its categories to those of 
‘respectable’ sciences: the mind-body problem resists solution. Folk psychology is ripe 
for elimination – and the entities, properties and processes it postulates are likewise ready 
to disappear. 
Can this type of argument be run in the case of innateness? It is true that the 
innate has resisted reduction to the categories of some or other science – the motley 
collection of analyses in §1 is testament enough to that. But is it true that the theory has 
stagnated, or that its domain is in retreat? I don’t think so. To be sure, there are things 
that nativists cannot explain, and there are limits to the explanations they offer, but the 
charge of degeneracy can hardly be leveled at the developmental sciences that are 
currently making use of the idea of innateness. On the contrary, they have been hugely 
productive, especially over the last few decades. The search for the innate has inspired 
philosophers, psychologists, biologists and other scientists not only to talk about what 
‘innate’ means, but to investigate the development of so-called innate traits in 
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extraordinary depth, leading to a vast explosion of knowledge about how the processes of 
development unfold in us and other species. 
The case of language acquisition is very much to the point. Chomsky’s claim that 
universal grammar is innate has inspired several generations of smart young people to 
devote their lives to explaining how language is acquired. This was not even considered a 
problem in the 18th, 19th or early 20th centuries, and although the behaviorists in 
psychology had begun to sniff around the issue by the late 1950s, Chomsky’s claim in the 
early ‘60s that language is innate focused people’s attention on this phenomenon in an 
unprecedented way, and led to the development of a huge body of new knowledge about 
how languages are learned, stored, used and lost. In light of developments like these – 
and they are paralleled in all sorts of other areas, such as the study of concept acquisition 
in psychology and philosophy, the study of birdsongs and various ‘instinctual’ behaviors 
in ethology, and the study of visual perception, face recognition, causal reasoning and 
mathematical abilities in psychology and neuroscience. There simply is nothing 
degenerate about the nativist's research program: the Doesn’t Work eliminativist’s 
argument has no purchase here. 
 
 
2.3It’s a Mess Eliminativism and its Implications for ElimiNativism 
 
However, the It’s a Mess eliminativist’s argument remains to be examined. §1 
constituted its first premiss: 'innate' is a term that stubbornly resists analysis. The second 
premiss asserts that the concept is so hopelesly muddled that it warrants elimination, 
regardless of any fruits borne by its deployment. Griffiths (1997, 2002) and Bateson 
(1983, 1991) advance arguments along these lines. 
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Griffiths (2002, 71) identifies three ‘core features’ as characteristic of the innate: 
(i) Developmental fixity: innate traits are hard to change; 
(ii) Species nature: what is innate is somehow related to what it is to be a member of a 
certain species; 
(iii) Intended outcome: innate traits are non-accidental; they are somehow meant to be 
there. 
These three properties, he argues, pretty much capture what we pretheoretically take 
innateness to be. Moreover, he argued, each of them has a ‘respectable’ and related 
successor concept in modern biological science: the successor to developmental fixity is 
canalization; the descendant of species nature is species typicality; and the notion of an 
adaptation provides a scientifically decent gloss on what it might be for some outcome to 
be intended. 
However, he continues, if that is what innateness is, then that notion is in deep 
trouble. For these properties frequently come apart in actual cases. For instance, bilateral 
symmetry in vertebrates is highly canalized and typical of the phylum, but is not an 
adaptation, being rather the result of developmental constraints. A Live Oak’s 
generously spreading crown is species-typical and adaptive, but that growth pattern is not 
canalized: in high altitudes, the Live Oak's profile is sparse and scrubby. An Australian 
Aborigine's dark skin is adaptive and canalized, but not species-typical. Griffiths argues 
that because the properties clustering together under ‘innateness’ need not co-occur, 
continuing use of the term encourages fallacies of equivocation, such that a trait's 
evolutionary origin (say) is inferred from its species typicality, or its immutability is 
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inferred from its being an adaptation. If we mean developmental fixity, species typicality 
or whatever, we should just say so. 
From their consideration of the various proposed analyses of innateness, Mameli 
and Bateson (Mameli and Bateson 2005) identify a larger cluster of ‘core’ features of 
innateness, which they call ‘innateness properties’ or ‘i-properties.’ These are (p. 26): 
 
 
(1) reliably appearing in a particular stage in the life cycle 
 
(2) being such that environmental manipulations capable of producing an alternative trait 
are evolutionarily abnormal 
(3) not being produced by a mechanism adapted to map different environmental 
conditions onto different phenotypes and, at the same time, not produce by the impact 
of evolutionarily abnormal environmental factors 
(4) being generatively entrenched 
 
(5) being developmentally environmentally canalized (i.e., development is buffered 
against a wide range of environmental changes) 
(6) being post-developmentally environmentally canalized (i.e., once the trait has 
developed, it is stable under a wide range of environmental variation) 
(7) being species-typical 
 
(8) being a standard Darwinian adaptation 
 
 
 
They point out that whether or not these ‘i-properties’ are highly correlated or not “is an 
empirical question, and an important one.” (p. 27). Answers to it allow us to answer a 
range of other, important empirical questions (e.g. “How often and in what circumstances 
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does natural selection result in developmental or post-developmental canalization?” 
(p.27)). In addition, they would also have implications for elimiNativism: “If the i- 
properties cluster, then it is appropriate to say that the folk concept [of innateness] does 
track a real biological phenomenon: … it tracks what we can call the ‘innateness 
syndrome.’” (30) In that case, they argue, the concept of innateness would be 
“scientifically useful in that it could play a positive role in theory development and in the 
discovery of generalizations.” (30) However, if the i-properties are not highly correlated, 
“we shouldn’t try to use the notion of innateness while doing science…[in that case] the 
various debates that have been framed in terms of innateness are better dealt with by 
referring to each of the i-properties individually.” (30-31) 
 
 
2.4Something of a Paradox. 
 
The arguments discussed in §2.3, as well as the rather motley character of 
Bateson and Mameli’s list of ‘i-properties’ itself, however, suggest that the i-properties 
are not highly correlated. By Bateson and Mameli’s lights, as by Griffiths', then, the 
concept ‘innate’ should be eliminated. 
But to accept this conclusion is to confront a somewhat paradoxical situation: 
‘innate’ is a concept that is inadequate in numerous ways, failing to carve nature at its 
joints, meaning different things to different people, and thereby generating fallacious 
reasoning, confusion and an inordinate amount of analytical despair. Yet at the same 
time, it seems to be a linchpin of a vital and exciting set of explanatory research programs 
and projects in the sciences of the mind (§2.3). As analytical philosophers, it appears, we 
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can’t live with the concept; yet as cognitive scientists, it appears just as plainly, we can’t 
shoot it. 
What is to be done? 
I suggest: nothing. 
In §3, I argue, first, that it is quite common in science for investigators to continue 
using concepts that everyone knows to be inadequate – ambiguous, vague, incomplete, 
perhaps even incoherent. I maintain, secondly, that this practice seems de facto to be part 
and parcel of the development of new, better ways of conceiving the world. I urge, third, 
that there are philosophical (not just historical) reasons to expect this to be the case. And 
thus I conclude that it's a bad idea on both pragmatic and philosophical grounds to 
eliminate bad concepts -- like 'innateness' -- until better ones are found. 
 
 
3.Good Uses for Bad Concepts 
 
3.1 'Gene' 
 
In two recent papers (2006, forthcoming), Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths  
describe the development of the concept ‘gene.’ The term 'gene' was introduced by 
Johannsen (1911), but the origins of the corresponding concept are much more obscure. 
In large part, this is because there wasn't and still isn't a single gene concept in use in 
biology, or even in genetics itself. In the early days, most geneticists were 
instrumentalists about genes or ‘factors’: they were defined functionally, as the elements 
(possibly fictional) that were transmitted from parent to offspring and explained observed 
patterns of inheritance. Each Mendelian trait, or ‘character’ was associated with a single 
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‘factor,’ and traits that did not follow a Mendelian inheritance pattern were held to be 
produced by two or more genes. 
But little attention was paid to the question of what genes were. Even Thomas 
Hunt Morgan, whose group established that genes are arranged linearly on chromosomes, 
was content to regard them as purely hypothetical entities, mere fictions used in 
calculating the observable results of hybridization experiments, “because at the level at 
which genetic experiments lie, it does not make the slightest difference” (quoted G&S, 
‘instrumental gene’ section, para 1). However, Herman J. Muller, a student of Morgan, 
was dissatisfied with the instrumental notion of ‘gene’ and set out to discover genes’ 
physical basis. According to him, genes were physical entities that could replicate and 
mutate, and that played a role in the construction of phenotypes. Whether they 
corresponded to the classical geneticist’s factors was for Muller unimportant. Thus gene- 
properties that for the classical concept had been essential, because definitional, were  
now treated as accidental and open to question. 
The advent of the field of biochemistry, between the two world wars, led to 
further refinements of the gene concept. For instance, now genes had to be the kinds of 
molecules that could create other, very specific molecules, with highly constrained 
conformations: genes were individuated one-to-one with their specific enzymatic 
products. It was thought that genes were proteins, because the structures of proteins, like 
those of enzymes, were tightly constrained. This ‘one gene-one enzyme’ view led early 
evidence that genes were composed of DNA to be ignored, as DNA did not seem to have 
the complex structure the hypothesis required. It was not until the 1940s, when new 
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experimental techniques and assumptions were introduced into biochemistry by 
physicists such as Max Delbruck, that it was accepted that genes were made of DNA. 
In the early 1950s, Richard Goldschmidt had pointed out that the geneticist’s 
instrumentalist conception of a gene (and related concepts like ‘mutation’) was 
incompatible with the material concept emerging in biochemistry. He urged that the 
biochemist’s conception was the correct one, famously opining that there were no genes, 
at least in the classical sense. Genetic eliminativism! 
After the structure of DNA was elucidated by Watson and Crick, further changes 
in the gene concept occurred. For instance, Muller had held that genes were by definition 
the unit of recombination, which was held to occur only when alleles from the two 
different arms of the chromosome come together during meiosis. Seymour Benzer, 
however, established that recombination could occur within a gene, as parts of the gene 
changed position. This led to the dropping of the requirement that genes be what are 
recombined in (sexual) reproduction, and the foregrounding of genes’ functional role: 
genes became the segments of DNA that produce the molecules of RNA that produce a 
specific protein (or, later, other product). 
At the same time as the molecular gene concept was evolving, so too was the 
geneticist’s more instrumentalist conception. By the 1970s, geneticists had abandoned 
their forebears’ insistence that genes were what mutated and recombined; all that 
remained of the classical conception was genes as contributors to phenotypes. Griffiths 
and Stotz argue that at this point, the two conceptions were compatible and that both 
sides (so to speak) were more or less in agreement about what genes are. And although 
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they go on to show that this halcyon period was brief, with ‘gene’ again coming unstuck 
(and remaining so today), Griffith and Stotz conclude that this story represents 
…a highly successful example of the research strategy of identifying a functional 
role, searching for the mechanism that fulfills that role at a lower level of analysis, 
and using knowledge of that mechanism to refine understanding of function at the 
original (in this case phenotypic) level of analysis. (p. xxx) 
And indeed it does. However I wish to draw a slightly different moral from their 
tale. The philosopher-historian telling a hundred years of history in thirty pages can only 
gesture at the turmoil, breast-beating (and, occasionally, despair) that accompanied this 
conceptual evolution as it was actually going on. At the time when Goldschmidt declared 
that there are no genes, it appeared to those in the field not just that the geneticists’ 
concept was never going to square with that of the biochemists’, but – and importantly – 
that the biochemical concept itself was hopelessly muddled, empirically unjustified, 
perhaps at times even empirically invalidated. Yet it appears to us just obvious that the 
field would have made a gross mistake had it followed Goldschmidt’s eliminativist advice 
and given up on genes – certainly the things, but even the word or concept. Many        
new discoveries and techniques, not to mention better concepts, were born of the jostling 
between the apparently incompatible notions of gene-as-replicator, gene-as-protein, gene- 
as-locus-of-mutation, gene-as-producer-of-phenotypical-characters, etc. And while the 
counterfactuals are, of course, speculative, it is hard not to believe that had any of these 
been jettisoned prematurely, the nature of the relations between them would not have been 
clarified, but rather obscured further, to the likely detriment of both biological research 
and our understanding of the world. 
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Good things can come from ‘bad’ concepts. 
 
 
 
3.2 'Principle' or ‘Element’ 
 
In this section, we look at another case illustrating how science makes eminently 
productive use of concepts that everyone knows to be inadequate. The historian Ursula 
Klein (2005) traces the development of organic chemistry from pre-1750 botanical 
practices up until the late 19th century, when modern classifications and nomenclature 
emerged. I argue that this account demonstrates that particularly when the structure of 
some natural phenomenon or domain is genuinely up for grabs, it can be necessary – in 
the strongest, albeit pragmatic sense – to continue using concepts that one knows are ripe 
for elimination in order to design and carry out the very experiments that will reveal the 
true nature of that domain. 
Prior to 1750, European chemists accepted the ancient distinction between the 
three natural ‘kingdoms’ of plants (‘vegetables’), animals, and minerals. (Klein, 2005: 
268-9 In their attempts to classify vegetable substances further, they drew on the practices 
of those involved in the non-scientific manipulation of plants and their derivatives,         
for instance, apothecaries, dyers, brewers, and traders. Numerous lists classifying      
plant materials were published around this time, each differing significantly                 
from the others as to the placement of particular substances. Nonetheless, according to 
Klein, classification was organized around three (maybe four) main categories: (i) natural 
origin (species, country or city, type (e.g., Balsam of Peru)); (ii) mode of extraction 
(substances made by nature (‘simples’) vs. substances made by human art -- ‘composita’ 
(mixtures) and ‘preaparata’ (simple chemical extractions)); (iii) Observable or sensible 
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properties (waxes, gums, leaves, etc. and their properties – e.g., balsams have a strong 
aromatic smell, syrupy consistency, yellow-brown color, and minimal or no solubility in 
water); and, less commonly, (iv) Practical uses (e.g., substances that were used in 
brewing and distilling were grouped together, as were those used in the production of 
wines and spirits, as were those used as dyes. 
Notably not among these classificatory principles is what the substance is made 
of. This is not because no-one was interested in the composition of plant and other 
natural substances. On the contrary, the search for the alchemist’s ‘ultimate principles,’ 
the underlying natures that caused the perceived properties of natural substances, was 
most definitely afoot at this time. Nor is the chemists’ lack of taxonomic interest in 
constituent structure due to no-one’s having thought to base classification on 
constituency. Georg Ernst Stahl, for instance, had proposed a taxonomy that classed 
substances based on their composition and modes of chemical combination in 1730. 
(Klein, p.269, n.12.) 
Rather, the search for constituents had little or no impact on the classificatory 
project because “chemists did not consider knowledge of composition a reliable 
precondition to order all of the kinds of materials they were dealing with.” (269) And as 
we now know, they were right! For the constituents that were being sought (and ‘found’) 
at this period were the ‘ultimate principles’ postulated in the alchemical philosophy, such 
as phlegma, spirit, oil, salt, and earth. Since they don’t exist, and since substances have 
always refused to behave as if they did, taxonomists were right to ignore them. 
In their taxonomic endeavors, in other words, chemists were behaving as if they 
were eliminativists about principles or constituents – and about ‘principles’ and 
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‘constituents.’ Those terms and properties were not relevant to the scientific task at hand, 
and were not used or adverted to. But it would have been a mistake for these theorists to 
have elevated their decision to pursue one taxonomic course rather than another into a 
matter of eliminativist principle. Any of the arguments we examined in § 2 – Aren’t  
Any, Doesn’t Work, It’s a Mess – could have been run on the notion of a principle or 
constituent to justify eliminativism, ontological and linguistic. But the abandonment of  
all talk and thought of principles in chemistry from 1750 onwards would have been a 
disaster, as the rest of Klein’s story indicates. 
For after 1750, constituency was gradually foregrounded as the foundation for 
vegetable taxonomy. Spurred by the discovery of substances’ ‘proximate principles’ or 
‘compound components,’ and spurring in turn numerous further developments in 
chemical practice and theory, the search for the elemental structure of organic substances 
culminated 150 years later in Dumas’ 8-volume Traité de chimie appliqué aux arts 
(1835), widely regarded as the first work of organic chemistry as we know it today. The 
interplay between changing conceptions of substances’ principles or elements, new 
experimental techniques and instruments, new representational techniques, and 
developing theories about the organization of nature that made this magnificent 
achievement possible simply could not have happened had some hypothetical 
eliminativist about principles or elements ‘won’ in the 1750s. 
The first development relevant to the emergence of a constituent taxonomy was a 
proliferation, around mid-century, of a variety of new chemical techniques. In addition to 
distillation, decoction and combustion, chemists began to stress the use of mechanical 
means (such as grinding), low-temperature (‘wet’) distillation, and various solvents as 
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being important means for the chemical analysis of plant substances. (283) These new 
analytical methods served in the first instance to reveal that the old taxonomy (outlined 
above) was inadequate. For instance, the old distinction between simples and praeparata 
was undermined when analysis showed that some simple substances (like saps and resins) 
were more similar to various praeparata (like essential oils) than to other simples (say, 
leaves). Thus, the French chemist Venel (along with many others) classified saps and 
essential oils together as being among the proximate principles or compound constituents 
of plants. (287) 
A second vital development was conceptual. Between the 1750s and 1790s, 
chemists recognized plants as organized living beings, and began replacing the three 
‘kingdoms’ of the previous centuries with a bipartite division of nature into organized or 
‘organic’ beings (plants and animals), on the one hand, and those that are not so 
organized (minerals), on the other. This reclassification was no simple merging of the 
animal and vegetable kingdoms. For instance, Rouelle placed some plant-derived 
substances, such as balsams, resins, and gums on the mineral side of the divide, and in 
1766, Macquer attributed a vegetable origin to the former ‘mineral,’ bitumen. Macquer 
also proposed a criterion of the organic in terms of constituency, rather than origin: both 
animal and plant bodies contained “an inflammable, fatty or oily substance” (291) 
whereas minerals did not, and by 1790, it was recognized that certain mineral salts were 
not among the principles of plants, even though they could be extracted from plants. The 
old taxonomy was breaking down, but no new orthodoxy had yet emerged. 
A third precondition for the rise of a new classificatory schema was the 
importation into organic chemistry of discoveries about inorganic substances. In 1789, 
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Lavoisier, together with a number of other chemists, had published the Méthode de 
nomenclature chimique. It codified the trend that was emerging more slowly in plant 
chemistry, explicitly excluding from taxonomic consideration such properties as place in 
the three kingdoms, sensible properties, manner of production or extraction, and practical 
application.  Instead, it advocated the classification metal oxides, acids and salts based  
on their composition. The new, ‘elemental’ chemistry was vastly more explanatory than 
the old, for Lavoisier had coupled a ‘theory of affinity’ to his theory of composition. 
According to the affinity theory, the various elemental constituents of inorganic 
substances bore mutual relations of affinity with one another, and were in equilibrium 
only at ordinary temperatures. This explained why upon heating, the various component 
parts were released from the bonds of affinity, and made manifest. The notion of affinity 
also explained why different ‘proximate principles’ were observed under different 
conditions. 
By the early 1800s, the community of chemists, impressed with the new 
chemistry’s successes in the inorganic realm, recognized that this kind of elemental 
approach was, in principle, the way to go in classifying organic substances as well. 
Lavoisier himself had suggested applying the elemental approach to organic substances, 
proposing in the Méthode that “the true constituent elements of vegetables are hydrogen, 
oxygen and charcoal” (L. quoted K, p.300.) However, no serious attempt to analyze plant 
substances in terms of these basic elements was made until well after the turn of the 
century. (Lavoisier had abandoned the search for the principles of plants soon after the 
Méthode was published.) Instead, chemists continued to try to develop taxonomies that 
were recognizable descendants of the older, more practical and phenomenological 
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approach. Some substances got put in different classes, to be sure, and the classes 
themselves were played with and renamed. But further developments were necessary 
before the ‘elemental’ approach to taxonomizing organic substances could finally be 
taken. 
A major impediment to such a step, according to Klein, was a lack of conceptual 
tools for understanding how the various elemental substances could combine to produce 
the variety of observed organic substances. While chemists around 1800 knew that 
organic substances were made of hydrogen, oxygen and carbon, and while they wanted to 
taxonomize them in these terms, they could not “because of the absence of a theory of 
definite quantitative composition that would have allowed the clear identification and 
demarcation of the different kinds of plant substances.” (314) J.J. Berzelius recognized 
the problem acutely. His experiments had shown that wildly different substances – for 
instance, sugar and gum – contained the same proportions by weight of the elemental 
substances: 
Sugar: 6.802% hydrogen 
 
44.115% carbon 
 
49.083% oxygen 
 
Gum: 6.792% hydrogen 
 
41.752% carbon 
 
51.456% oxygen (Klein 2005:314) 
 
How, then, were the two to be distinguished? Berzelius recognized that by 
assuming that different elemental substances had ‘atoms’ of different characteristic 
weights, he could get clearly different accounts of their composition: 
42 	  
Gum: 12 O + 13 C + 24 H 
 
Sugar: 10 O + 12 C + 21 H 
 
This – also the origin of modern chemical nomenclature – was a major 
breakthrough. However, a further theoretical problem, noted but not addressed by 
Berzelius, remained. For it seemed clear that the mere numbers of the different ‘atoms’ 
could not account for the observed differences among organic substances: some 
substances that differed only a little in the number of atoms they contained differed a lot 
in their observed properties, and conversely. 
This problem was solved by Dumas and Boullay. In 1828, they argued that not 
only was the number of atoms of each element important to a substance’s identity, but so 
too was how the atoms were put together. They proposed that the substances that they 
had grouped together – namely, two kinds of sugar, ethal (a substance isolated from fat), 
alcohol, and ethers – were not directly composed of the elements, but nonetheless shared 
the same ‘binary constitution’ (K:316): they were all “compounds of bicarbonated 
hydrogen” and the differences between them were explained in terms of differences in 
the other, non-bicarbonated component. (316) Dumas and Boullay’s insight is still 
celebrated as the beginnings of organic chemistry as we know it today. (318) 
By 1835, substances were no longer being classified according to superficial 
similarities (sensible or chemical) or in terms of their uses or origins. Instead, as Dumas 
urged in his 8-volume Traité de chimie appliqué aux arts they were classified “from a 
purely chemical standpoint” (Dumas, quoted in Klein, 2005:318) – that is, in terms of 
“their atomic weights and…the rational formulae which represent their nature and their 
properties” (p. 319). Even substances made in the laboratory were to be treated in this 
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way, so long as their constituency – being compounds of carbon -- marked them as 
organic. And substances formerly thought to be emblematic of plant chemistry – such as 
wood fibers, fibers, corn starches – were no longer of interest to plant chemists. Carbon 
chemistry had begun, and with it came a whole new ontology for organic chemistry. 
More good things from (really) terrible concepts. 
 
 
 
4.Against Premature Elimination 
 
In §3, with the examples of ‘gene’ and ‘principle’ (what we now call ‘element’), I 
have tried to show that conceptual confusion is not unheard of in science; nativists are not 
alone in having only a dim and confused idea of what it is they are talking about. 
Further, as I tried to show in § 3.1, the clashing of incompatible concepts can be highly 
fruitful of research: the battle of the instrumental vs. the material gene led workers both 
in genetics and in biochemistry to examine their own concepts more closely than they 
would perhaps otherwise have done, to the benefit of both disciplines. And finally, as 
I’ve tried to bring out in § 3.2, scientists often have no choice but to keep working with 
concepts that they know to be inadequate. It’s simply not possible to design, conduct and 
interpret the very experiments one needs in order to show the way forward without using 
some concepts – and if the bad old concepts are the only ones available, well: it’s put up 
or shut up. Organic chemists could not have simply tossed out the ultimate principles of 
the alchemists, or the proximate principles of the pre-1750s taxonomies, until they had 
something else to put in their place. And even when they knew what the correct 
principles were – oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon – they still were unable to theorize in 
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terms of them until a wealth of other knowledge and techniques had been developed 
 
using precisely the incorrect principles they were aiming to replace. 
 
Modern discussions of innate traits look a lot like 18th century discussions of 
vegetable materials. Different taxonomies of developmental processes abound (canalized 
vs. not; entrenched vs. not; learned vs. not; genetically determined vs. not). It seems that 
our talk of innateness is functioning to delineate in a general way what the topic of 
inquiry is, just as the early ‘ultimate’ and ‘proximate’ principles, and the taxonomies that 
went along with them pointed in the direction of the truly organic. 
And just as late 18th century chemists knew that their taxonomic principles were 
the wrong ones, yet couldn’t burn the boat they were fishing from, we can know that the 
innate/not innate distinction is not quite the right one to make, yet keep right on making it 
nonetheless. These are concepts that ‘glom onto’ important classes of closely related 
phenomena, even though they don’t get the boundaries of those classes exactly right, and 
even though they don’t properly taxonomize the kinds of phenomena that are in the family 
they refer to. Socrates said, more or less, that you can't learn something if you don't 
already know it. I say: you can't investigate something if you don't have a way of 
thinking about it. The concept of innateness, I contend, enables us to think about 
developmental phenomena that we don't yet fully comprehend. Throw that concept away, 
and we lose that ability; lose the ability to think about those phenomena, and you         
lose the ability to investigate them. 
With these points in mind, we can return to the question that heads this paper: 
why isn’t Stich an elimiNativist? We saw in §2 that the ‘Aren’t Any’ argument doesn’t 
run, because there’s nothing that’s essential to innateness; that the ‘Doesn’t Work’ 
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argument doesn’t work, because the nativist research program is flourishing; and that the 
‘It’s a Mess’ argument poses a conundrum. On the one hand, ‘innate’ really is a mess, 
and as philosophers, appalled at the sight of a concept so déshabillé, we long to draw 
a veil. On the other hand, though, there is that siren research program to contend with. 
What to do? 
 
On the basis of the historical examples discussed in §3, I have suggested that in 
this kind of case, philosophical prudery should yield to a more permissive pragmatism. 
Good things can and sometimes do come from thoroughly misbehaved concepts. 
Premature elimination can be disastrous, obstructive to progress and destructive of 
thought itself. As long as 'innate' appears to be swinging along alright, it's wiser not to 
interfere; when it's time for the concept to retire, it'll be clear – or at any rate, clearer than 
it is right now. 
My brief in this paper was to be critical. And indeed, I began with the idea of 
showing how Steve's Quinean, scorched-earth nerve had failed him in respect of the 
innate. As it turned out, however, I discovered that there were good reasons not to be 
elimiNativist. At least, they seem good to me, and I expect that they probably seem good 
enough to Steve as well, himself a vigorous shoot from the Peircean root. If I'm right 
about this, though, it strikes me as an interesting further question why pragmatic 
considerations should incline him to hang on to the innate, at the same time as he is quite 
happy to jettison the intentional. I suspect that another of his Peircean biases – the pro- 
science, anti-philosophy one this time – is at the bottom of that. 
But that's a topic for another time. Maybe Thursday. 
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